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The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has made enforcement of laws against disorder and
quality-of-life offenses a central part of their policing strategy. Concomitantly, New York City
(NYC) experienced a renaissance in orderliness, cleanliness, tourism, real estate value, and crime
reduction, although other problems such as poverty, unemployment, drug abuse, racial tensions and
homelessness persist. This paper examines quality-of-life policing practices in NYC, describes the
philosophical underpinnings, explores the critical response to the program and presents lessons of
potential relevance to other policing organizations in the U.S. and around the world.
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INTRODUCTION
New York City’s (NYC) experiences and policing initiatives over the past three decades has
served as a laboratory of policing innovation. One of the most widely discussed initiatives has
been quality-of-life or QOL policing, the use of law enforcement against relatively minor
behaviors with the immediate intended goal of improving the quality of life. QOL policing has
been heralded by some of the most acclaimed police commanders and academics in the world,
while opposed by others. This controversy is completely consistent with the evolution of
modern policing. The modern Western police force has its roots in the 1800s experiences of
Sir Robert Peel, who introduced the first full-time, uniformed police force to preventatively
patrol the streets of London (Richardson, 1974; Uchida, 1989). That effort increased formal
social control to maintain order in response to prevailing circumstances, namely the growth of
industry and the city. Similar to QOL policing, that program was strongly criticized by some
as favoring the interests of businesses and wealthier citizens and raised questions about the
role of policing in a free society. Richardson (1974) noted that the history of policing in the
U.S. is characterized by a series of innovations accompanied by criticisms and dialogue. Thus
the basis for intelligent evolution of a policing system requires evaluation of each innovation,
its context and its criticisms. This paper describes how QOL policing was part of a larger
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response to conditions in NYC, describes the specifics of the QOL policing model, examines
criticisms, and summarizes lessons learned. The distilled findings should help inform the
NYPD’s continual evolution and the evolution of other policing programs around the world
interested in adapting QOL policing to their circumstances.
NYC, DRUGS AND DISORDER IN THE 1980s
Coming into the 1980s, policing practice across the U.S. was shifting away from a reliance on
the investigative function and turning its attention to community policing, as police agencies
began to place greater importance on crime prevention. These changes were reflected in the
widespread adoption of problem-oriented and community policing ideas and practices
designed to mobilize community members against crime (Greene, 2000; McElroy, Cosgrove
& Sadd, 1993; Goldstein, 1990). In NYC, Police Commissioner Lee P. Brown adopted this
philosophy, changed the NYPD mission statement, and invested in personnel in an effort to
establish a partnership between the NYPD and the community to address neighborhood
conditions.
As well-intentioned as the philosophy might have been, the strategic deployment of police
resources in NYC was overwhelmed by a rising tide of crime, much of it associated with crack
cocaine. An important flashpoint highlighting NYC’s crime problem was the murder of Brian
Watkins in 1990. Mr. Watkins was visiting NYC from Utah to attend the U.S. Open Tennis
Tournament. He was stabbed to death when he resisted a group of youths attempting to rob
him on the subway. In response to the rising crime, Mayor David Dinkins engineered passage
of legislation called “Safe Streets, Safe City,” which dedicated a portion of taxes and surcharges
to support 5,000 additional police officers. Despite these initiatives, Democrat David Dinkins
(mayor 1990–94) was labeled as weak on crime and lost a re-election campaign in 1993.
Republican Rudolph Guiliani (with Kerson, 2002) became mayor of NYC on a “tough on
crime” platform. His crime fighting record established his forcefulness—well before his
response to the 9/11/2001 collapse of the World Trade Center established him as a national
and international hero.
Looking back to the 1980s, it is truly hard to believe how widespread and intense social disorder
(as per middle-class standards) had become in NYC, especially in poorer neighborhoods. Much
of this disorder was associated with drugs. By 1980, marijuana and heroin use was well
established and the use of cocaine and then crack cocaine became widespread (Johnson, et al.,
1985; Johnson et al., 1990). Sellers of marijuana, heroin, cocaine—and especially crack—
conducted their business in abandoned buildings and even in public spaces that they defined
as “their territory” (Dunlap & Johnson, 1992). Drug sellers were active in every city park.
Many blocks were converted to drug “supermarkets,” with as many as 20 or more drug sellers
and their ever present customers (Curtis, 1998; Johnson, Golub & Dunlap, 2006). Passers-by
could easily observe persons injecting drugs, smoking crack or marijuana and were routinely
offered the opportunity to do the same. Of particular concern in the mid-1980s, crack selling
crews became ever more reliant on guns and violence to enforce their business claims
(Bourgois, 1995; Johnson et al., 1990). Despite police squads, these crack selling groups
remained viable into the early 1990s.
The conduct norms of drug/street subculture also promoted regular participation in what later
became targeted as quality-of-life behaviors. Drug abusers largely avoided expenditures
associated with normal living (Johnson, Golub & Fagan, 1995; Johnson et al., 1985). Many
were so impoverished by their drug consumption that they became residence-less. They would
stay with family and friends for as long as they were tolerated as “couch people.” Those with
weaker ties to conventionality slept on cardboard pallets in the streets or parks or in the subway
system. These recalcitrant homeless usually refused to sleep in public shelters (except in the
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coldest weather), even when invited to do so by outreach workers. Without a private residence,
they socialized (hung out) in public locations, drank alcohol, smoked and sold marijuana, left
their garbage everywhere, and urinated and defecated on the streets or in the parks. (NYC has
very few public toilets and showers available to the general public.) They conducted other
illegal behaviors in public including prostitution, con games, gambling, aggressive
panhandling, etc.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF QOL POLICING IN NYC
During the 1980s, QOL policing had been developed and successfully employed to restore
order within the NYC subway system by adhering to a “fixing broken windows” perspective
(Kelling & Coles, 1996; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). This perspective contends that social and
physical disorder provides a setting for more serious crime. Activities such as public loitering,
begging, drinking in public, using or selling drugs in public, urinating in public, prostitution,
litter and graffiti may increase fear among ordinary citizens, leading to their avoidance of
affected areas. Conversely, the departure of conventional citizens makes the public spaces more
inviting settings for serious criminal activity. Based on this logic, the broken windows analogy
redirected policing attention to the entire environment of public locations, and especially
towards persons who conducted illegal behaviors that others found offensive.
In the 1990s, Mayor Guiliani introduced a number of major policing initiatives and expanded
the use of QOL policing. Police Commissioner William Bratton was given the mandate to
focus on restoring order as a means of “reclaiming the streets” from criminals. Many of the
key police personnel who developed and implemented these innovative policing strategies have
published books about their experiences and thinking. William Bratton (with Knobler, 1998
was NYPD Transit Chief (1990–1992) and Police Commissioner (1994–1996)—he oversaw
implementation of the most innovative policing strategies that continue to the current time.
Jack Maple (1999) was a career NYPD officer who transformed academic and strategic ideas
into practical policing strategies and wrote key strategy documents. He envisioned and
developed the COMPSTAT management system, with top chiefs (especially Louis Anemone,
John Timoney), and key staff (lawyer Jeremy Travis and mapping expert John Yohe). Bernard
Kerik (2001) was the NYPD Corrections Commissioner and Police Commissioner (2000–
2001). Academics have also provided extensive analyses of the development of NYPD crime
fighting strategies (Henry, 2002;Karman, 2000;Kelling & Coles, 1996;Silverman, 1999).
During Bratton’s Commissionership, NYPD leadership developed a management approach
that changed the way the NYPD was run. Before Bratton, innovation and creativity were seen
as threats to smooth operations and invitations for trouble. The NYPD had been organized as
a strict hierarchy with approvals needed at all levels before any operational changes were
allowed. This created a climate where the department was run by headquarters; field
commanders were rewarded not for their efforts in reducing crime and improving neighborhood
conditions, but for keeping the status quo and avoiding problems.
Bratton shifted the responsibility of identifying problems, creating plans and tactics, and
implementing them from headquarters to the Precinct Commander through COMPSTAT
(Henry, 2002; NYPD, 1998; Silverman, 1999). COMPSTAT was originally a name of the
computer file “Compare Statistics” that was used to track crime data throughout NYC. Each
Monday, all 76 precincts were required to report the tallies for seven of the eight index crimes
(murder, rape, robbery, felony assault, burglary, grand larceny, and auto theft). On Wednesdays
and Fridays, precinct commanders and their counterparts from the Detectives, Vice, Narcotics,
Auto Crime, and other units were called to Headquarters to account for crime and disorder, to
describe their response to these conditions, and to take responsibility for the impact of their
efforts.
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These COMPSTAT meetings soon evolved from flip charts and “pin maps” to computerized
maps highlighting geographic variation in crimes and arrests. Everyone present was expected
to coordinate activities to address “hot spots” (Silverman, 1999; Bratton with Knobler, 1998).
Officers were routinely promoted for being innovative and risk-taking and demoted or passed
over if not. The COMPSTAT management process has been expanded and fine-tuned over the
years. Virtually every definable activity (e.g. reported crimes, arrests, stops, searches,
summons, citizen complaints, staff assignments, allegations of incivility, quality-of-life stops,
weapons discharges, police schedules, etc.) is recorded on a daily basis by all police officers,
the numbers are checked by supervisors, and then entered into computerized systems, where
they are entered into the Geographic Information Systems used to generate maps. Eterno and
Silverman (2006) reported that COMPSTAT was embraced by police executives but actually
alienated lower-level officers because of its intensive top-down management style.
In conjunction with COMPSTAT, the NYPD developed ten broad “Strategy Documents”, to
address gun carrying, youth violence, drug dealing, domestic violence, auto-related crime and
other concerns (Silverman, 1999, p. 205). In 1994, QOL policing became part of the
standardized set of law enforcement tools under NYPD (1994) Policing Strategy 5: Reclaiming
the Streets of New York City. In the remainder of this section, we highlight three intended
characteristics of this policing strategy: responsiveness, deterrence, and serious crime control.
1) Responsiveness
QOL policing addresses the numerous everyday problems frequently brought to the attention
of the police by the community. Serious crime is generally rare, even in high crime areas. Often,
the public at large is more concerned with disorder and incivility. At community meetings, the
overwhelming share of complaints often deal with noise, public drinking and urinating, graffiti,
prostitution, drugs sales and use. Before the broad implementation of QOL policing, local
commanders were expected to accept these complaints, address them as best they could, and
then devote their attention to serious police issues like robbery, burglary, and murder. The
development and implementation of QOL policing gave commanders the support and
encouragement necessary to pursue quality-of-life violations with vigor, and gained the
ongoing support from conventional citizens.
2) Deterrence
QOL policing is intended to create official and word-of-mouth publicity designed to send a
message [the police term], especially to violators, that certain behaviors are not tolerated. The
uniformed police on the streets provide a strong visual message as they intervene with QOL
offenders. Interventions by plainclothes officers send a secondary message that violators
cannot evade arrest simply by observing that uniformed police are not present. The police
demonstrate they mean business when QOL offenders are treated like ordinary criminals.
3) Serious Crime Control
QOL policing allows the NYPD to engage in a variety of proactive strategies and tactics that
result in a powerful police presence in virtually every neighborhood. These activities can
potentially control crime by apprehending offenders at large, by gaining intelligence about
unresolved cases, and by preventing crimes before situations get out of hand. QOL policing
focuses on minor offenses but not necessarily upon minor offenders. Research has
demonstrated that persons arrested for QOL violations also tend to have extensive criminal
histories. Stopping persons engaged in minor QOL offenses, checking their identification and
running a field background check can locate individuals who are wanted on other criminal
charges, have outstanding warrants, are violating probation or parole, or show other signs of
potential involvement in more serious crime. Advocates like to point to the case of John
Royster, Jr. who in 1996 was apprehended for farebeating (Maple, 1999, p. 160). A fingerprint
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match placed him at the scene of a recent murder. He was subsequently linked to four other
unsolved murders and eventually convicted of homicide.
QOL policing also allows the police to gather intelligence about other crimes in the area. The
NYPD implemented a policy that arrested persons had to be “debriefed,” i.e., asked about other
crimes. Specifically, the police asked about the location of drugs and guns, locations that bought
and sold stolen goods, and the whereabouts of wanted persons. In this manner, the innocuous
QOL arrestee might provide information about serious crime and the location of wanted
criminals (Maple, 1999). Maple (1999: 153–177) notes that several QOL violations were
particularly useful to crime investigations including: beer and piss (public urination), gambling,
noise, truancy and curfew violations, prostitution (both prostitutes and their patrons) and
graffiti.
QOL policing may also prevent potential crimes from occurring. Many cases of murder, assault,
robbery, etc. have contributing factors stemming from QOL issues. Illegal card and dice games,
drinking and drug use and sales in public, etc. are often associated with violence. Through
QOL enforcement the police may be able to intervene in these situations before they get out
of hand, possibly preventing more serious crimes before they occur.
CRITICISM OF NYPD AND QOL POLICING
In NYC, as in many locations, there exists an ongoing conflict between conventional culture
and various alternative lifestyles that conventional society defines as deviant (Burke, 1998;
Eterno, 2001). QOL policing intensifies this clash by enforcing laws against any deviance,
irrespective of the crime severity. Thus, much of the criticism of QOL policing is rooted in
sympathies for marginalized subpopulations and best understood by examining the broader
circumstances faced by the subpopulations. Two groups heavily affected in NYC include the
recalcitrant homeless and marijuana smokers.
Recalcitrant Homeless
Homeless single adults constitute a highly visible form of social disorder in NYC (and
elsewhere). During the daytime, they can be seen loitering and hanging around many public
locations in NYC. At night time, however, their use of city social services effectively divides
the homeless into two subpopulations. NYC has a relatively liberal policy (within American
society) of providing shelter and food to all who seek it. The compliant homeless go to a variety
of city-funded shelters and programs where they are served dinner and breakfast and provided
a place to sleep. They are also given the opportunity to take a shower and to obtain clean clothes.
The compliant homeless are also offered and may participate in a range of referrals to other
relevant social services (e.g. welfare, drug treatment, mental health services, job training,
housing, etc.).
The recalcitrant homeless have generally had prior experience with and reject staying at
shelters, and also reject a variety of other social services that may be offered by numerous
outreach workers. They prefer to remain in public locations during the night (and daytime).
These are the homeless that confront the NYPD. Several court decisions have determined that
the police may not arrest someone for being homeless, nor for sleeping in public space. But
the courts have allowed police to arrest persons sleeping on two seats in a subway car or on a
bench in the subway. The NYPD has been relatively effective in enforcing these policies, so
that passersby will less often than in the 1980s see a homeless person sleeping on park benches
or sprawled out on subway cars. In response, the recalcitrant homeless have learned to sleep
sitting up (especially in the winter) on subways or benches and on cardboard pallets on the
sidewalk in warmer weather.
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Marijuana Consumers that Smoke in Public
In the 1970s, New York State decriminalized the possession and sale of small amounts (under
25 grams) of marijuana. However, the use, possession, and sale of marijuana in public locations
were still defined as misdemeanor offenses. Today, we guesstimate that as many as half a
million New Yorkers may consume marijuana once to several times a day, but the vast majority
does so in private residences. Wealthier consumers often make their purchases in private using
a delivery service (Sifaneck et al., 2007). The NYPD undertakes few enforcement efforts
against marijuana possessors or sellers in private settings.
However, in the 1990s the NYPD targeted smoking, possessing, or selling marijuana in public
as part of QOL policing and smoking marijuana in public view soon became the most common
target of QOL policing. As a result, thousands of marijuana smokers were handcuffed, booked,
detained in a locked cell for up to 24 hours, and arraigned. From 1999 to the present time,
nearly 10–15% of all adult arrests in NYC were for marijuana use, possession, or small sale
(Golub et al., 2007). Most often, judges dismissed the charge or sentenced the offender to time
served and so the primary punishment became the arrest itself (Golub, Johnson & Dunlap,
2006, 2007; Johnson et al., 2006).
Minorities
Some view quality-of-life initiatives as a growing intolerance for the marginalized poor,
especially the homeless and those that smoke marijuana in public for lack of an alternative
location. QOL policing sanitizes our daily public interactions by upholding civic norms.
However, this activity ignores the often-sharp disagreements over what the civic norms should
be and what the priorities of the government should be. It also ignores the counter expectations
by citizens stopped by police that the officer will forgive “their inadvertent violation” of a local
code. These citizens expect the officer to use discretion, issue a verbal warning only, and not
to write a ticket or summons, and especially not to handcuff and arrest them.
Accordingly, some critics and even some admirers contend that QOL policing is zero-tolerance
policing. Bowling (1999) reports that strict enforcement—New York style—has been
proclaimed as the official policy of police forces in Britain, Norway, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Germany, Hungary, Israel, Japan, and China. On the other hand, numerous academics, civil
libertarians, and social critics use the term zero-tolerance policing to indicate an uncaring
repressive policy responsible for many excesses in police behavior, ranging from homicide,
physical brutality, and the violation of civil rights of gays, homeless, mentally ill, and virtually
every minority group (Bowling, 1999; Dixon & Maher, 2005; Greene, 1999; Harcourt, 2001;
McArdle & Erzen, 2001).
In terms of learning from the NYC experience, it is very important to distinguish between the
QOL and zero tolerance policing approaches. Zero tolerance is a politically charged phrase.
Rosenbaum, Lurigio, and Davis (1998) noted that zero tolerance is often used primarily as a
rhetorical description but that it does not represent a clearly defined strategy. Jack Maple
(1999) cautions against the term zero tolerance policing to refer to QOL policing:
“Quality-of-Life Plus” is not “zero tolerance.” (p.156) There’s always someone …
who starts making noise about … how I’m about to import “zero tolerance” tactics
that compromise individual rights while aiding and abetting [police] brutality. (p. 212)
…”Zero tolerance” is bad policy and a bad strategy. When used as a synonym for
“Quality-of-Life Plus”, as it often is, it distorts the intent and reality of how these
tactics are carried out in an earnest and well-orchestrated fight against crime. (p. 213)
Whether it is called QOL, fixing broken windows, order maintenance, or zero tolerance
policing, NYPD’s aggressive law enforcement since the 1980s has added to race/ethnicity and
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class tensions in NYC. Many contend that QOL policing “widens the net” for arrest and
disproportionately targets blacks and Hispanics (Harcourt, 2001; McArdle & Erzen, 2001;
Spitzer, 1999).
Golub Johnson, Taylor & Eterno (2004) found that QOL policing mostly affected blacks and
Hispanics although interestingly it did not appear to widen the net. Analysis of a sample of
persons detained for booking found that QOL and serious arrestees were similar with regard
to demographic composition, prior criminal record, past-year participation in a variety of QOL
offenses, drug use, educational attainment, marital status and employment. These findings
suggest that as opposed to widening the net that QOL policing provided more arrest
opportunities for a large pool of persons who engage in serious crimes, less serious crimes,
and QOL misbehaviors in an unpredictable manner. This finding is consistent with prior
research that indicates that offenders tend not to specialize, rather the same individuals tend to
engage in a variety of illegal behaviors (McGloin et al., 2007). Leading theories suggest this
may be due to either opportunity structure (offenders have a range of criminal activities
available to them) or to propensity (individuals with low self-control will engage in whichever
criminal opportunities present themselves) or an interaction of the two.
However, it appears that any law enforcement in NYC whether it targets serious or relatively
minor offenses tends to have a disproportionate impact on minorities. Of note, 90% of the QOL
arrestees in NYC in 1999 were black or Hispanic, but so were most (89%) of those arrested
for serious (felony) crimes during this same time period. Similarly, another study, found that
blacks and Hispanics comprised more than 80% of all persons arrested for smoking marijuana
in public in NYC (Golub, Johnson & Dunlap, 2007). Ridgeway (2007), however, found few
important ethnic disparities in NYPD stop, question, and frisk practices.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
QOL policing is an important strategy for addressing various departures from civic norms in
public locations. This approach has both advantages and disadvantages, depending on a
stakeholder’s vantage point. This section sums up key findings from the NYC experience that
can inform the implementation of QOL policing elsewhere.
QOL policing has a primary effect of reducing the public visibility of the targeted behaviors
The transformation in NYC since the early 1980s has been striking. In the early 1980s,
marijuana (and other drug) sellers routinely approached almost all passersby, offering them
“loose joints” and other drugs in virtually every park, many streets, and a variety of other public
locations. Groups and individuals openly smoked marijuana. These activities dominated and
even controlled the use of public space in many parts of NYC. In the absence of effective and
targeted police enforcement, drug sellers and users advanced an alternative morality and their
own civic norms. Likewise, alcohol was widely consumed (and illicitly sold) in many parts of
NYC. Several areas were prostitution strolls. The homeless and drug abusers slept on the
subways during the evenings and even during rush hours. By the late 1990s, virtually all flagrant
violations of civic norms had receded to the point that casual passersby would seldom observe
them. Street drug sellers rarely dare to approach passersby with their wares. Users are much
less likely to consume drugs openly. It is hard to imagine these changes having occurred in
NYC without the QOL policing initiative.
QOL policing can help stop or reverse community decline
QOL policing and the effective containment of the variety of social disorders has gained the
NYPD great credibility and respect within the NYC political system, across the U.S., and
internationally. Kelling & Coles (1996) argue that disorderly persons contribute to the decline
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of urban neighborhoods. QOL policing reduces their impact and restores the impression that
only conventional activity will occur in public settings. QOL policing is part of the major
investments in NYC, both public and private, to create a much improved quality of life for its
residents. Indeed, private organizations (e.g. Central Parks Conservancy, Business
Improvement Districts) as well as the sanitation, parks, social services departments have
conducted many parallel efforts to improve the quality of life in public spaces during the 1990s
and 2000s by establishing and enforcing regulations to eliminate dog feces on sidewalks,
recycle bottles and cans, keep the streets clean of litter and garbage on a regular basis, increase
plantings of trees and flowers in small parks, stop persons from picking flowers, restore and
maintain lawns and sports facilities, provide social services for the homeless and poor on the
streets, etc. The combination of policing, sanitation, business contributions, and parks
improvements made Manhattan and NYC a much more attractive and vibrant urban center in
the 2000s than it was in the 1980s.
The value of enforcement can be gauged by consideration of what would happen if QOL
policing did not happen
In NYC, persons who engage in illegal drug sales and use, illegal vending, and homelessness
are constantly present in various locations. Under QOL policing, these actors are constantly
looking out for police and undercover officers—and so now undertake major efforts to conceal
their behaviors from both police and citizen passersby. If police stopped QOL and drug
enforcement in even a couple of precincts, the number of illegal vendors and active street-level
drug sellers would likely mushroom in a short period of time. Homeless persons would likely
construct shelters (called “cardboard condos”) on public space and effectively live there.
Ethnographic evidence strongly indicates that people are still engaged in alternative lifestyles.
QOL policing appears to serve as a deterrent to their commission in public locations.
QOL policing does not necessarily reduce involvement in alternative lifestyles and illegal
behaviors
QOL policing has probably contained public displays of deviant lifestyles but is nowhere close
to eliminating the lifestyles themselves. For example, virtually all marijuana users in NYC are
acutely aware that they will be arrested for smoking, possessing, and selling marijuana in public
locations. As a partial result, virtually all working and middle class marijuana smokers
(probably the majority of marijuana users) avoid smoking in public locations. The poorest and
least conventional persons, who often lack a private location, are the ones to generally risk
marijuana use in public locations; but they look around for police before doing so (Ream et
al., 2006). They are highly aware that an undercover officer or bike patrol officer could stop
and arrest them. Also, many of those who smoke marijuana in public increasingly smoke bunts
(marijuana in a cigar shell) which conceal the true nature of their behavior from unwary
passersby. However, marijuana use remained high despite the large numbers of arrests for
marijuana possession and use under QOL policing. The ADAM program which tracks drug
use among arrestees recorded substantial increases in marijuana use during the very period
(1994–1998), right when QOL policing was being introduced in NYC (Golub & Johnson,
2001; Johnson et al., 2006b).
Even though marijuana sellers no longer aggressively approach all passersby in NYC parks
and streets, the vast majority (80%) of ADAM arrestees in Manhattan (compared to a National
median across ADAM locations of 20%) approach sellers and make marijuana purchases in
outdoor (public) locations (ADAM, 2000). Yet almost all marijuana transactions in public
locations are sufficiently concealed that most conventional citizens (and even undercover
police) do not observe the sales. Even the annual NYC marijuana-legalization spring march
and rally has declining numbers of participants, and every participant is told that undercover
officers will try to (and actually) make arrests of those smoking marijuana (Sifaneck, 2006).
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Likewise, the number and visibility of homeless persons in NYC remains about the same—
but they are more likely to be observed sitting up while sleeping than in the 1980s. QOL policing
patrols consistently remind the recalcitrant homeless of where they cannot sleep; so fewer
attempt to sleep in public parks, on park benches, or sprawled out on subway cars or benches.
When the police do observe homeless in places they are not allowed to sleep they almost
certainly expel them from that setting and may even arrest them. While some recalcitrant
homeless keep their few possessions in shopping carts, they no longer can build semi-
permanent shelters on public space as police and sanitation crews will throw out these shelters;
they are urged by police to “move on” and “not here.”
Some local behaviors are much harder to change than others
Police sensibilities can be a constraint to the scope of QOL policing. In 1998, Mayor Giuliani
ordered the NYPD to enforce city regulations against jaywalking and announced that those
walking against traffic lights would be issued tickets. However, virtually every New Yorker
will cross the street against a red lights if no moving vehicles are coming, even those that abide
by other laws. Hence, the rank and file of the NYPD simply refused the order. As a New Yorker,
it can be strange visiting places where jaywalking is actually enforced and where citizens wait
for the green light before crossing an intersection, even when there are no cars coming.
There is no clear evidence that QOL policing decreases commission of more serious crime
(robbery, burglary, assaults, drug sales, gun possession, etc.)
The narrative descriptions of NYPD policing initiatives written mostly by its architects claim
that the broad declines in crime in NYC during the 1990s was due to these enforcement changes
such as QOL policing (Bratton with Knobler, 1998; Guiliani with Kurson, 2002; Kelling and
Sousa, 2001; Maple, 1999; Silverman, 1999). Other analysts find very limited, if any evidence,
of the changes in offender behavior that can be attributed to QOL policing (Eck & McGuire,
2000; Harcourt, 2001; Rosenfeld, Fornango & Baumer, 2005). More extensive research is
needed on whether or not QOL policing impacts (and if so, how much) upon other forms of
criminality.
QOL policing does not have to expand the net of persons arreste
Golub et al. (2004) found little evidence for net widening as a result of QOL policing. This
raises the question, “Why aren’t more whites, working persons, or better educated persons
being arrested for QOL offenses?” We advance two potential explanations that appear
plausible, however, we provide no formal evidence of their accuracy. First, the more
advantaged persons could be more likely to learn about and comply with civic norms and know
not to engage in these types of behavior in public places (e.g. middle-class marijuana smokers
confine use to private settings, and avoid smoking in public locations). This would make them
rarely observed and unlikely to sustain a QOL arrest.
Second, the NYPD made identity checking a central element of QOL policing (Maple, 1999;
Bratton with Knobler, 1998). If the offender can present a state-issued picture ID (driver’s
license, employer cards, school ID) and a radio check reveals no warrants, current probation
or parole status, then protocol is for the officer to issue a verbal warning. Because most working
and middle class persons have such identification and no current record in the state criminal
justice data base, most middle/working class persons engaged in a QOL behavior who are
stopped by police retain their liberty. By contrast, severely marginalized persons stopped for
QOL violation are much more likely to not have (or choose not to carry) personal identification,
and may have outstanding warrants leading police to handcuff, arrest, and bring them in for
arraignment.
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The burden of QOL policing falls most heavily on poor, marginalized, ethnic populations
From the perspective of persons engaged in such behaviors, QOL policing is highly
objectionable and perceived as a routine violation of their civil liberties and rights as citizens.
Most importantly, these groups contend that the NYPD has unduly targeted ethnic minorities,
that NYC is not concerned about their larger economic and social problems, that police officers
are unduly aggressive, and that police discretion favors wealthier white persons (Websdale,
2001). This concern serves as an important corrective to slavishly implementing QOL policing
without consideration of the prevailing social context, especially as experienced by the most
marginalized populations.
CONCLUSIONS
QOL policing is an effective program for relieving some of the problems facing a city or any
community. It expands the police function beyond reacting to serious crime in order to achieve
other social policy goals. QOL policing constrains the individuals involved with subcultures
that challenge conventional norms for public behavior, such as selling or using marijuana in
public locations or sleeping on the subway. In this manner, the program establishes public
conformance with civic norms, creates order, reclaims public locations for conventional
activities and provides the potential for other quality-of-life and economic transformations to
take place.
To the extent that QOL policing works, it holds much promise. However, QOL is not a
comprehensive crime control nor a broader economic development program. By itself in NYC,
QOL policing would simply be a band-aid covering numerous social problems without healing
the underlying needs. Thus, we hold that QOL policing in general should be accompanied by
outreach programs addressing the challenges of marginalized populations. Without these
efforts, QOL policing may seem like zero tolerance policing designed to oppress less wealthy
minority populations and to keep them out of sight.
QOL policing was part of a larger group of initiatives introduced in NYC during the 1990s
aimed to manage police activity, reclaim public space, and stimulate economic activity. The
future for QOL policing is strong for NYC, as well as other locations in the U.S., several
European countries, and Australia. Every jurisdiction and society has numerous and unique
political problems, powerful constituencies, vested interests, different subcultures of deviants,
and public visibility of behaviors that may be included in QOL policing. Hence, the definitions
of the specific behaviors for police to enforce, the procedures implemented (or not) to handle
arrestees, and ability to address implementation problems, will likely mean that even police
leadership committed to the NYPD model will customize their policing policy in ways that
differ from QOL policing as practiced in NYC during the 1990s and into the 2000s.
Acknowledgments
The research presented was supported by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) and
administered by the National Institute of Justice (98-8252-NY-IJ; 2000-7353-NY-IJ), by grants from the National
Institute on Drug Abuse (5 T32 DA07233-24, R01 DA013690-05), by the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program
in New York City (National Institute of Justice and National Opinion Research Corporation: OJP-2001-C003,
Subcontract 6073), and by National Development and Research Institutes, Inc. An earlier version of this manuscript
was presented at a Fulbright Conference in Brisbane Australia in July 2003.
The authors acknowledge the many contributions to this research made by John Eterno, Angela Taylor, and ADAM
interviewers. We especially thank key staff at the Office of Policy Planning of the NYPD, the Mayor’s Office of the
Criminal Justice Coordinator, the NYC Criminal Justice Agency, and the NYS Division of Criminal Justice Services.
The opinions expressed in this paper do not represent the official position of the funding agencies, nor National
Development and Research Institutes.
Johnson et al. Page 10














Bruce D. Johnson is the director of the Institute for Special Populations Research at the National
Development and Research Institutes, Inc. He has been conducting extensive ethnographic and
quantitative studies of illegal drug users and sellers in NYC since the 1970s. He also directs
the largest pre- and postdoctoral training program in the U.S. He is one of the nation’s leading
authorities on the criminality and illicit sales of drugs in the street economy and among arrestees
and minority populations. Over the course of his career, he has published six books and over
150 articles based on more than 30 research and prevention projects funded mostly by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse and National Institutes of Justice.
Andrew Golub is a Principal Investigator at National Development and Research Institutes,
Inc. He also teaches courses on drugs and crime at the University of Vermont. His research
focuses on understanding drug use trends and other criminal behaviors in context with an aim
towards informing public policy. His work often involves the integration of quantitative and
qualitative research methods.
James E. McCabe is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at Sacred Heart University. He
is a 21-year veteran of the NYPD, where for two years he was the Commanding Officer of the
NYPD Police Academy and Training Bureau. His research interests are in police organizational
behavior and how the dynamics of drug and quality of life enforcement affect crime levels and
community safety.
References
Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring (ADAM) Program. 1999 annual report on drug use among adult and
juvenile arrestees. National Institute of Justice; Washington, DC: 2000.
Bourgois, P. In search of respect: Selling crack in El Barrio. New York: Cambridge; 1995.
Bratton, WJ.; Knobler, P. Turnaround: How America’s top cop reversed the crime epidemic. New York:
Random House; 1998.
Bowling B. The rise and fall of New York City murder: Zero tolerance or crack’s decline? British Journal
of Criminology 1999;39(4):531–554.
Burke, Roger Hopkins. The socio-political context of zero tolerance policing strategies. Policing: An
International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 1998;21(4):666–682.
Curtis R. The improbable transformation of inner-city neighborhoods: Crime, violence, drugs, and youth
in the 1990s. Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1998;88:1233–1276.
Dixon D, Maher L. Policing, crime and public health: Lessons for Australia from the “New York miracle.
Criminal Justice 2005;5(2):115–143.
Dunlap E, Johnson BD. The setting for the crack era: Macro forces, micro consequences (1960–92).
Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 1992;24(3):307–321. [PubMed: 1491281]
Eck, JE.; Maguire, ER. Have changes in policing reduced violent crime? An assessment of the evidence.
In: Blumstein, A.; Wallman, J., editors. The crime drop in America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge;
2000. p. 207-265.
Eterno JA. Zero tolerance policing in democracies: The dilemma of controlling crime without increasing
police abuse of power. Police Practice 2001;2:189–217.
Eterno JA, Silverman EB. The New York City Police Department’s Compstat: Dream or nightmare?
International Journal of Police Science & Management 2006;8(3):218–231.
Goldstein, H. Problem-oriented policing. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill; 1990.
Golub A, Johnson BD. The rise of marijuana as the drug of choice among youthful arrestees. National
Institute of Justice. Research in Brief. 2001 NCJ 187490.
Golub, A.; Johnson, BD.; Dunlap, E. Smoking marijuana in public: The spatial and policy shift in New
York City’s arrests, 1992–2003; Harm Reduction Journal. 2006. p. 22Retrieved from
http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/3/1/22
Johnson et al. Page 11













Golub A, Johnson BD, Dunlap E. The race/ethnic disparities in misdemeanor marijuana arrests in New
York City. Criminology and Public Policy 2007;6(1):131–164. [PubMed: 18841246]
Golub A, Johnson BD, Taylor A, Eterno JA. Quality-of-life policing: Do offenders get the message?
Policing: International Journal of Police Strategies and Management 2003;26(4):690–707.
Golub A, Johnson BD, Taylor A, Eterno JA. Does quality-of-life policing widen the net? A partial
analysis. Justice Research and Policy 2004;6(1):19–41.
Greene, JR. National Institutes of Justice. Criminal justice 2000. Vol. 3. Washington, DC: National
Institutes of Justice; 2000. Community policing in America: Changing nature, structure, and function
of the police; p. 299-370.
Greene JA. Zero tolerance: A case study of police policies and practices in New York City. Crime and
Delinquency 1999;45(2):171–182.
Guiliani, RW.; Kurson, K. Leadership. New York: Hyperion; 2002.
Harcourt, BE. Illusion of order: The false promise of broken windows policing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard;
2001.
Henry, VE. The COMPSTAT paradigm: Management accountability in policing, business, and the public
sector. Flushing, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications; 2002.
Johnson, BD.; Goldstein, PJ.; Preble, E.; Schmeidler, J.; Lipton, DS.; Spunt, B.; Miller, T. Taking care
of business: The economics of crime by heroin abusers. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books; 1985.
Johnson, BD.; Golub, A.; Dunlap, E. The rise and decline of drugs, drug markets, and violence in New
York City. In: Blumstein, A.; Wallman, J., editors. The crime drop in America. revised. New York:
Cambridge University Press; 2006. p. 164-206.
Johnson BD, Golub A, Dunlap E, Sifaneck SJ, McCabe J. Policing and social control of public marijuana
use and selling in New York City. Law Enforcement Executive Forum 2006;6(5):55–85.
Johnson BD, Golub A, Fagan J. Careers in crack, drug use, drug distribution, and nondrug criminality.
Crime and Delinquency 1995;41(3):275–295.
Johnson, BD.; Williams, T.; Dei, K.; Sanabria, H. Drug abuse and the inner city: Impact on hard drug
users and the community. In: Tonry, M.; Wilson, JQ., editors. Drugs and crime, Crime and Justice
Series. Vol. 13. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 1990. p. 9-67.
Karman, A. New York murder mystery: The true story behind the crime crash of the 1990s. New York:
New York University Press; 2000.
Kelling, GL.; Coles, CM. Fixing broken windows: Restoring order and reducing crime in our
communities. New York: Free Press; 1996.
Kelling, GL.; Sousa, WH, Jr. Do police matter? An analysis of the impact of New York City’s police
reforms. Civic Report No. 22. New York: Manhattan Institute; 2001. Retrieved from
www.manhattan-institute.org
Kerik, B. The Lost Son: A Life in Pursuit of Justice. NY: Regan Books; 2001.
Maher L, Dixon D. Policing and public health: Law enforcement and harm minimization in a street-level
drug market. British Journal of Criminology 1999;39(4-Special issue):488–512.
Maple, J. The crime fighter. New York: Broadway Books; 1999.
McArdle, A.; Erzen, T., editors. Zero tolerance: Quality of life and the new police brutality in New York
City. New York: New York University Press; 2001.
McElroy, JE.; Cosgrove, CA.; Sadd, S. Community policing: The CPOP in New York. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage; 1993.
McGloin JM, Sullivan CJ, Piquero AR, Pratt TC. Local life circumstances and offending specialization/
versatility: Comparing opportunity and propensity models. Journal of Research in Crime and
Delinquency 2007;44(3):321–346.
NYPD. NYPD police strategy number 5: Reclaiming the streets of New York City. 1994.
NYPD. COMPSTAT manual. New York, New York: NYPD; 1998.
Preble E, Casey JJ. Taking care of business: The heroin addict’s life on the street. International Journal
of the Addictions 1969;4:1–24.
Ream, G.; Johnson, BD.; Dunlap, E.; Sifaneck, SJ. Distinguishing blunts users from joints users: A
comparison of marijuana use subcultures. In: Cole, S., editor. Street drugs: New research. Hauppauge,
NY: Nova Science Publishers; 2006. p. 245-273.
Johnson et al. Page 12













Richardson, JF. Urban police in the United States. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press; 1974.
Ridgeway, G. Analysis of racial disparities in the New York Police Departments’ stop, question, and
frisk practices. Santa Monica: Rand; 2007.
Rosenbaum, DP.; Lurigio, AJ.; Davis, RC. The prevention of crime: social and situational strategies.
Belmont, California: West/Wadsworth Publishing; 1998.
Rosenfeld R, Fornango R, Baumer E. Did Ceasefire, COMPSTAT and exile reduce homicide?
Criminology and Public Policy 2005;4:419–450.
Sifaneck, SJ. Field observations at annual pro-marijuana rallies. New York: NDRI; 2006.
Sifaneck Stephen J, Geoffrey Ream, Johnson Bruce D, Eloise Dunlap. Retail marijuana purchases in
designer and commercial markets in New York City: Sales units, weights, and prices per gram. Drug
and Alcohol Dependence 2007;90S:S40–S51. [PubMed: 17055670]
Silverman, EB. NYPD battles crime: Innovative strategies in policing. Boston: Northeastern University
Press; 1999.
Skogan, WG. Disorder and decline: Crime and the spiral of decay in American neighborhoods. New
York: Oxford University Press; 1990.
Spitzer, E. The New York City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices: A Report to the people of
the State of New York from the Office of the Attorney General. 1999. Retrieved from
www.oag.state.ny.us
Uchida, C. The development of the American police: An historical Overview. In: Dunham, RG.; Alpert,
GP., editors. Critical issues in policing: Contemporary readings. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland
Press; 1993. p. 15-32.
Websdale, N. Policing the poor. Boston: Northeastern University Press; 2001.
Wilson JQ, Kelling GL. Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. Atlantic Monthly. 1982
March, 29–38;
Johnson et al. Page 13
Police Pract Res. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2010 August 1.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
